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THE PRIOR OBLIGATIONS OBJECTION TO 
THEOLOGICAL STATEISM
Frederick Choo
Theological stateist theories, the most well-known of which is Divine Com-
mand Theory (DCT), ground our moral obligations directly in some state of 
God. The prior obligations objection poses a challenge to theological stateism. 
Is there a moral obligation to obey God’s commands? If no, it is hard to see 
how God’s commands can generate any moral obligations for us. If yes, then 
what grounds this prior obligation? To avoid circularity, the moral obligation 
must be grounded independent of God’s commands; and therefore DCT fails 
to ground all moral obligations in God’s commands. I argue that DCT pro-
ponents should embrace “metaethical DCT.” On this view, there is no moral 
obligation to obey God. God creates our moral obligations out of normative 
nothingness. I argue that this helps DCT proponents to escape the prior obli-
gations objection. Other theological stateist theories can modify their theory 
similarly to meet this objection.
Introduction
Theological stateism holds that our moral obligations are “directly, imme-
diately, and entirely dependent upon some state of God, where divine 
willings, commands, desires, and other attitudes all count as states.”1 The 
most well-known of version of theological stateism is Divine Command 
Theory (DCT), which says that our moral obligations are grounded in 
God’s commands.2 In this paper, I defend theological stateism against a 
recent challenge known as the “prior obligations objection.” To address 
the objection, I argue that DCT proponents should embrace what Mark 
Murphy calls “metaethical DCT.” On this view, there is no moral obli-
gation to obey God. God creates our moral obligations out of normative 
nothingness. I argue that this helps DCT proponents to escape the prior 
1Wielenberg, Robust Ethics, 73.
2For discussion of other theological stateist theories, see Murphy, “Divine Command, 
Divine Will, and Moral Obligation”; Quinn, “Obligation, Divine Commands and Abraham’s 
Dilemma”; Miller, “Divine Desire Theory and Obligation”; and Jordan, “Divine Commands 
or Divine Attitudes.”
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obligations objection. Other theological stateist theories can modify their 
theory similarly to meet this objection.
The Prior Obligations Objection
Critics of DCT have posed the following dilemma for the view.3 Either
(1) There is no moral obligation to obey God’s commands, or
(2) There is a moral obligation to obey God’s commands.
Let us first suppose that a DCT proponent wants to affirm (1). Critics 
of DCT argue this is unacceptable. If there is no moral obligation to obey 
God’s commands, how can DCT be true? After all, if there is no moral 
obligation to obey God’s commands, how can God’s commanding activity 
create any moral obligations for us? Why should we obey what God com-
mands? The idea here is that if our moral obligations come from God’s 
commands, then there must be a moral obligation to obey God in the 
first place, a “prior obligation” to obey God. Without appealing to the 
prior obligation, God’s commands seem to lack normative authority and 
hence cannot be the source of our obligations.4 Call this problem the why-
obey-God problem. Because of this problem, some critics of DCT do not 
even consider (1) a plausible option for DCT proponents. Ralph Cudworth, 
for example, says “[T]hat we should be obliged to obey . . . must proceed 
from . . . an antecedent obligation to obedience in the subjects.”5 Similarly, 
Nicholas Wolterstorff says, “Commands are not the sort of thing that can 
generate obligations ex nihilo; they presuppose a normative context of 
prior obligations and rights.”6 Wolterstorff thinks that in order for God’s 
commanding to generate obligations, there must already exist a “standing 
obligation on our part to obey God by performing such actions as God 
may command,” and this standing obligation cannot be generated from 
God’s commands.7 So these critics think that DCT proponents must affirm 
(2) and cannot hold to (1).
Affirming (2) however results in two problems for the DCT proponent. 
First, (2) seems to entail that God’s commanding is not the source of all 
moral obligations.8 This is because the moral obligation to obey God 
cannot come from God’s commands itself, for this would be viciously 
circular. To see this, imagine your friend says that you are obligated to 
3Forms of this argument have been raised by Mackie, The Miracle of Theism, 114–115; 
Cudworth, Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality, Wolterstorff, Justice: Rights 
and Wrongs, 274–281; Forcehimes, “Ethical Theories and Their Application,” 23–24; Fales, 
“Divine Commands and Moral Obligation,” 156–157, Wielenberg, Robust Ethics, 53–55.
4Forcehimes, “Ethical Theories and Their Application,” 24.
5Cudworth, Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality, 18. See also Wielenberg 
(Robust Ethics, 54) who echoes this.
6Wolterstorff, Justice, 276.
7Wolterstorff, Justice, 277.
8Forcehimes, “Ethical Theories and Their Application,” 24.
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obey her commands. When you ask why you are obligated to obey her 
commands, she says it is because she commanded you to obey her. This 
is explanatorily circular and thus unacceptable. If there is an obligation to 
obey your friend’s commands, it has to be grounded independently of her 
commands. Likewise, if there is a prior obligation to obey God, it must 
be grounded independently of God’s commands. Therefore, DCT fails 
to ground all our moral obligations in God’s commands.9 Second, a DCT 
proponent who embraces (2) would plausibly hold the prior obligation as 
a brute fact, having no further explanation or grounding. If there is a brute 
moral obligation, then DCT would lose one of their explanatory advan-
tages over non-theistic ethical theories which take a brute-facts approach. 
Erik Wielenberg, for example, defends a non-theistic ethical theory where 
ethical facts are substantive, metaphysically necessary, and brute.10 And 
he is not alone in holding such a view. A number of philosophers have 
embraced such a theory. DCT proponents have previously argued that 
DCT is better than such non-theistic ethical theories because DCT does 
more explanatory work by grounding our moral obligations in God. It 
is better to hold to a theory which says that morality has its foundation 
in God rather than having no foundation at all. Saying that morality has 
no foundation is problematic because the existence of moral obligations 
seems to cry out for an explanation. Non-natural moral obligations, which 
exist without explanation, are often thought of as queer or odd entities. 
Wielenberg himself however argues that theological stateist theories must 
posit brute ethical facts and hence are in the same boat as his own non-the-
istic ethical theories.11 If a DCT proponent embraces (2) and holds that 
(2) is simply a brute moral obligation, then DCT would lose one of its 
explanatory advantages. Just as DCT proponents have criticized non-the-
istic ethical theories for positing brute moral obligations, Wielenberg can 
criticize DCT by asking back, “what is the grounding for [the prior obli-
gation]? Does it simply float mysteriously in an unintelligible way?”12 He 
can simply point out that “on both [Wieleneberg’s theory and theological 
stateist theories], the bottom floor of objective morality rests ultimately on 
nothing.”13 Now of course the DCT proponent who embraces (2) might 
not hold the prior obligation as a brute fact. However, such a view still 
faces a similar problem, as we will see later.
The prior obligations objection applies to the other theological stateist 
theories in a similar way. In the objection above, we can simply substitute 
God’s commands for God’s will, attitudes and so forth. The same problem 
will then arise. So, the prior obligations objection is a challenge for the 
different theological stateist theories to meet.
9Forcehimes, “Ethical Theories and Their Application,” 24.
10See Wielenberg, Robust Ethics.
11Wielenberg, Robust Ethics, 42–46, 50–56. 
12Wielenberg, Robust Ethics, 53.
13Wielenberg, Robust Ethics, 55.
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The Proving-Too-Much Reply and Normative Divine Command Theory
Before advancing my own reply, I want to explore two replies that have 
been advanced by DCT proponents. The first reply is what I call the 
proving-too-much reply. Some DCT proponents have tried to show that the 
prior obligations objection would prove too much, as the objection would 
apply to all moral theories. Therefore, the objection cannot be right. Take, 
for example, social contract theory. Matthew Flannagan and Paul Copan 
say, “According to a social contract view, moral obligations are those re-
quirements that rational, impartial persons in a society would agree to. But 
[those who advance the prior obligations objection] could argue that one 
is morally obligated to such a contract only if there is already an obligation 
to follow such hypothetical agreements. So, the hypothetical agreement 
can’t itself be the source of moral obligations.”14 C. Stephen Evans makes 
the same point with respect to Kantianism.15 A Kantian says our moral 
obligations are those derived from the categorical imperative. But, once 
again, those who advance the prior obligations objection could argue that 
there must be a moral obligation to obey the categorical imperative in the 
first place. Therefore not all obligations come from the categorical imper-
ative. So DCT proponents like Flannagan, Copan, and Evans claim that if 
this objection is successful, then all moral theories have a similar problem. 
This would however show too much. Hence, we should think something 
has gone wrong with the objection. To note, these DCT proponents are 
not alone. Even Mark Schroeder, who is not a DCT proponent, has argued 
along similar lines.16
The proving-too-much reply however does not seem satisfactory to me 
for a few reasons. First, the proving-too-much reply is effective only in 
some contexts.17 For example, when in dialogue with philosophers who 
are already committed to moral realism, the proving-too-much reply 
may succeed.18 However, when in dialogue with philosophers not yet 
committed to moral realism, such a strategy may not always work. J. L. 
Mackie, for example, has raised the prior obligations objection and Mackie 
himself holds to an error theory of morality. Showing that the prior obli-
gations objection would apply to all (realist) moral theories would not be 
a good reply to Mackie. After all, Mackie’s arguments for an error theory 
of morality would similarly pose a problem for all (realist) moral theories. 
Yet, we do not think that we can simply dismiss Mackie’s arguments by 
pointing out that his arguments would create a problem for all (realist) 
moral theories. In fact, Mackie might happily agree that the prior obli-
gations objection applies to all (realist) moral theories and this would be 
14Flannagan and Copan, Did God Really Command Genocide, 165–167.
15Evans, God and Moral Obligation, 100.
16Schroeder, “Cudworth and Normative Explanations.”
17I thank Wayne Riggs for a discussion on this point.
18One reviewer has pointed out that expressivists who affirm that some actions are oblig-
atory and there is an explanation for it may be in the same boat as moral realists.
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another argument in favor of his error theory. So, although the proving-
too-much reply may be effective when in dialogue with moral realists, it 
fails as a reply to those who do not share the same commitments as moral 
realists.19
Second, it is not clear that the prior obligations objection actually ap-
plies to all moral theories. For example, it seems that the objection cannot 
be applied to Wielenberg’s theory, since Wielenberg already posits brute 
ethical facts that require no further explanation. So, it is simply not true 
that all moral theories face this objection.
Third, the proving-too-much reply does not directly address the 
dilemma. There is still a question of whether DCT proponents should em-
brace (1) or (2); and if DCT proponents choose to embrace (1) or (2), there 
is a further question of whether they can avoid the problems raised in the 
discussion of those possibilities.
Fourth, even if the proving-too-much reply shows us that the objection 
fails, it does not tell us why the objection fails. This makes the proving-
too-much reply rather weak and unsatisfactory. If the prior obligations 
objection really proves too much, it should be possible to identify the error 
in the objection rather than to stop after saying that the objection must 
have an error somewhere. Because of these criticisms, the proving-too-
much reply does not seem satisfactory to me.
Before proceeding further to a second reply to the prior obligations ob-
jection, it would be helpful to make a distinction between what Murphy 
calls metaethical DCT and normative DCT.20 Normative DCT (N-DCT) 
affirms (2). On N-DCT, there is a prior obligation which holds even if God 
does not command anything. N-DCT further states that all other moral 
obligations (aside from the prior obligation) obtain in virtue of this prior 
obligation and God’s commanding activity. For example, there is a moral 
obligation not to murder because (i) God commanded us not to murder, and 
(ii) we have a moral obligation to obey God’s commands. In contrast, the 
metaethical DCT (M-DCT) affirms (1). There is no prior moral obligation 
to obey God’s commands. Instead, “all moral requirements are produced 
by God out of normative nothingness.”21 So there is a moral obligation 
not to murder simply because God commanded us not to murder, without 
appeal to some prior moral obligation to obey God. On this view, we have 
no moral obligations prior to God’s commanding activity.
With this distinction in mind, we can look at a second reply. The 
second reply is to just agree with critics that DCT requires (2) and affirm 
N-DCT. Evans, for example, claims that if the prior obligations objection 
is successful, DCT proponents “could still hold that the vast majority 
of our moral obligations are generated from or identical with divine 
19See Mackie, The Miracle of Theism, 114–115; Mackie, Ethics.
20Murphy, “Divine Command, Divine Will, and Moral Obligation,” 12.
21Murphy, “Divine Command, Divine Will, and Moral Obligation,” 11.
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commands.”22 Evans thinks that if the objection is successful, then one can 
just affirm N-DCT instead. John Hare, who is a proponent of N-DCT, says, 
“Divine commands do not generate all our obligations, because there is 
one important exception, namely the very obligation to obey Divine com-
mands.”23 Hare thinks that this is not a troubling exception since it is a 
necessary truth that God ought to be obeyed.24 To note, the prior obliga-
tion is not a brute fact on Hare’s view, though it is a necessary truth. Hare’s 
argument for this is that God is supremely good and what is supremely 
good is to be loved. To love God however, one must obey God. While one 
support for this is found in Scripture, Hare also provides a Kantian line 
of argument. He argues that to love God, we must share in God’s ends, 
and this includes willing what God wills for our willing, which just is 
obedience.25 So the prior obligation is a necessary truth though not brute.
N-DCT, however, seems problematic to me for a two main reasons. 
First, it seems that N-DCT would need to posit some moral obligation as 
a brute fact. As noted above, a critic might think that this is because DCT 
proponents must say that the prior obligation is a brute fact. But on Hare’s 
view, the prior obligation is not a brute fact, though it is a necessary truth. 
N-DCT proponents may take a similar strategy as Hare and deny that the 
prior obligation is a brute fact. Still, it seems that Hare’s view would still 
result in positing some other moral obligation as brute. We can simply 
ask Hare, is there a moral obligation to love what is supremely good? Is 
there an explanation why this is so? I suspect Hare would probably say 
that there is no further explanation, and it is a brute fact that we have a 
moral obligation to love what is supremely good. So, N-DCT proponents 
either have to hold that the prior obligation is a brute fact or appeal to a 
further explanation that ends up at another brute fact. By appealing to 
such brute facts, N-DCT would lose one of its explanatory advantages 
over non-theistic accounts of morality (like Wielenberg’s ethical theory) 
since both theories posit brute moral obligations.
Second, the more major problem with N-DCT is that it is hard to justify. 
Why are all moral obligations, other than the prior obligation, grounded in 
God’s commands? Proponents of N-DCT cannot use many of the standard 
arguments for DCT. For example, one strength of DCT in my view is that 
it fulfills the intuition that normative laws require a lawgiver. Others have 
expressed this intuition in other ways such as saying that “requirements 
require a requirer” or “obligations require an obligator.” Many have ar-
gued that to fulfill this intuition, a moral lawgiver like God is necessary 
to explain the existence of moral obligations (or that God best explains 
the existence of moral obligations). This can be seen in some moral argu-
ments for theism. However, the N-DCT proponent must accept that God’s 
22Evans, God and Moral Obligation, 101.
23Hare, God’s Commands, 17–18.
24Hare, God’s Commands, 18.
25Hare, God’s Commands, 18.
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commands are not necessary to explain our moral obligations. After all, 
the prior obligation is a moral obligation which is not explained by God’s 
commands. So, this undermines the claim that all normative laws require 
a lawgiver. If so, it seems hard to justify that all moral obligations, other 
than the prior obligation, are indeed grounded in God’s commands. What 
reasons can one have for doing so? Furthermore, since the N-DCT propo-
nent must concede that there is a brute moral obligation which does not 
require God as an explanation, we can ask the N-DCT proponent why all 
other moral obligations cannot also be brute. If the prior obligation, or its 
explanation, is a brute moral obligation, why must one appeal to God’s 
commands to ground other moral obligations? N-DCT is hence problem-
atic and should not be accepted by DCT proponents.
Metaethical Divine Command Theory
In the previous section, I offered two reasons why DCT proponents should 
not accept N-DCT. Now, I will offer reasons for DCT proponents to accept 
M-DCT.26 I will also argue that M-DCT can address the why-obey-God ob-
jection that seemed to make holding to (1) problematic. So M-DCT escapes 
the prior obligations objection.
First, in arguing for DCT, a powerful motivation for DCT is the social 
nature of obligations.27 Obligations have a social nature in the sense that 
they arise by one person obligating another person. As noted, this has 
been expressed in various ways such as the idea that obligations require 
an obligator. Others have also provided further arguments for the social 
nature of moral obligations. Robert Adams, for example, argues for the 
social nature of moral obligations based on the fact that we feel guilty 
about violating our moral obligations.28 The prior obligation however 
would lack this social nature. After all, if the prior obligation exists, who 
obligates us to obey God? If we propose that a higher being obligates us to 
obey God, we can ask once again why we should obey that being and the 
same problem will arise ad infinitum. It seems then that one should say no 
one obligates us to obey God. If no one obligates us to obey God, then the 
prior obligation lacks the social nature. Hence, DCT proponents should 
not be committed to the existence of a prior obligation. Since M-DCT does 
not admit the existence of a prior obligation and on M-DCT all moral ob-
ligations have the social nature, DCT proponents should embrace M-DCT.
Second, some versions of DCT entail M-DCT. The versions I have in 
mind are those that take our moral obligations to be identical to God’s com-
mands.29 On such versions, God’s commands and our moral obligations 
26See Murphy for a different set of arguments. Murphy notes that arguments from the 
divine attributes (divine sovereignty, omnipotence, liberty and impeccability) have been of-
fered in favor of a metaethical version of theistic ethical theories ( “Divine Command, Divine 
Will, and Moral Obligation,” 12–16).
27See, for example, Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods.
28Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods, 238–241.
29See, for example, Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods.
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are one and the same thing. Now, suppose someone asks, “Why ought I do 
what is right?” A plausible reply is “simply because it is right.” We don’t 
think that there needs to be a moral obligation to follow our moral obliga-
tions. It does not make much sense to reply “because it is right to do what 
is right” or “because there is a moral obligation to fulfill our moral obliga-
tions.” Since there is no moral obligation to fulfill our moral obligations, 
and this version of DCT takes it that our moral obligations are identical to 
God’s commands, then it follows that there is no moral obligation to obey 
God’s commands. So versions of DCT that take our moral obligations to 
be identical to God’s commands entail M-DCT. On these versions, M-DCT 
can also meet the why-obey-God problem. When someone asks, “Why 
ought I do what God’s commands,” one does not need to say, “because 
there is a moral obligation to do what God’s commands.” Instead one can 
reply, “because God’s commands are our moral obligations. They are the 
same thing.” On M-DCT, the question “why ought I do what God com-
mands” just is the question “why ought I fulfill my moral obligations.”
Third, consider legal obligations. Philosophers may disagree on what 
justifies legal authority. However, it seems clear that if legal authority can 
be justified, then the appropriate legal authorities can create genuine legal 
obligations (typically by instituting laws or issuing commands) for those 
under its authority. Similar to the structure of DCT then, we can say that 
if an appropriate legal authority commands X, then X is a legal obligation 
for those under the legal authority. Call this view legal authority command 
theory (LACT). Now suppose one raised the prior obligations objection in 
the case of legal obligations. The objector says that either:
(1a) There is no legal obligation to do what legal authorities command, 
or
(2a) There is a legal obligation to do what legal authorities command.
As in the case of DCT, the objector then says (1a) is implausible because, 
without a prior legal obligation to obey legal authorities, the laws insti-
tuted by legal authorities cannot create legal obligations for us. However, 
if one accepts (2a), then this prior legal obligation must exist independent 
of the commands of legal authorities. Either way then, legal obligations 
cannot be grounded in legal authorities.
I think it is easy for those who hold to LACT to reject (2a). Defenders 
of LACT can simply ask how legal obligations can exist independent of 
the commands of legal authorities. Legal obligations must be grounded 
in legal authorities. Suppose there were no legal authorities on earth. One 
who affirms (2a) would have to say that there exists a legal obligation, 
namely the prior legal obligation. This seems deeply unintuitive. In the 
absence of any legal authorities (and them passing laws), it seems that 
there are no legal obligations at all. Therefore, one who holds to LACT 
should reject (2a). In reply to the objector, defenders of LACT can embrace 
(1a) and argue that (1a) does not entail that the laws instituted by legal 
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authorities cannot create legal obligations for us. One can instead appeal 
to the grounding of legal authority. Whatever grounds legal authority does 
not create a legal obligation to obey legal authorities. Instead, whatever 
grounds legal authority gives legal authorities the power to create legal 
obligations. Similarly, a DCT proponent may reject (2) and accept (1) on the 
same grounds. If moral obligations come from God, then DCT proponents 
should not think that there is a prior moral obligation to obey God. To 
address the why-obey-God problem, DCT proponents can similarly ap-
peal to whatever grounds God’s moral authority. Whatever grounds God’s 
moral authority does not create a moral obligation to obey God. Instead, 
whatever grounds God’s moral authority gives God the power to create 
moral obligations. Hence, DCT proponents should embrace M-DCT, and 
this is not problematic.
Objection: But We Ought to Obey God!
Theists who want to affirm that we ought to obey God may object to 
M-DCT, complaining that M-DCT entails that it is not the case that we 
ought to obey God. I believe there are at least three strategies that a pro-
ponent of M-DCT can take. First, one might notice that “we ought to obey 
God” can be understood de dicto or de re. Under the de dicto reading, “we 
ought to do what God commands” means that there is a moral obligation 
to do what God commands. Under the de re reading, “we ought to do 
what God commands” just means that for each act that God has com-
manded, we have a moral obligation to do that act. For example, God has 
commanded us to do acts like loving one another, upholding justice, and 
honoring one’s parents. Since we have moral obligations to do these acts, 
we have a moral obligation to do what God has commanded in the de re 
sense. So M-DCT can affirm that we ought to obey God if understood de re.
A second strategy for M-DCT proponents is to accommodate the idea 
that we ought to obey God in a different sense. Many times, people say 
statements like “you ought to do what is right” or “you should fulfill your 
moral duties.” These statements seem natural just as theists say “you ought 
to obey God.” Evans, however, points out that when a person says “you 
ought to fulfill your moral duties,” they do not mean “you have a moral 
duty to fulfill your moral duties.”30 Instead, saying that one ought to fulfill 
his moral obligations is just saying that “those obligations have genuine 
authority.”31 Likewise, saying one ought to obey God’s commands is just 
saying that God’s commands have genuine moral authority.32 Another 
way of putting it is to consider my earlier example of legal obligations 
again. When one says that we ought to obey legal authorities, we do not 
mean that there is a legal obligation to obey legal authorities. Saying that 
we ought to obey legal authorities just means that legal authorities can 
30Evans, God and Moral Obligation, 100.
31Evans, God and Moral Obligation, 100.
32Evans, God and Moral Obligation, 100.
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create legal obligations for us. They have genuine authority. Similarly, 
when we say that we ought to obey God, we do not need to mean that 
there is a moral obligation to obey God. Instead, we can say that we ought 
to obey God in the sense that God can create our moral obligations as God 
has genuine moral authority.
Third, a proponent of M-DCT might say that M-DCT entails that God 
can create all sorts of obligations and this include obligations to obey 
God.33 If God commands you to do an act, you merely have an obligation 
to do that act. However, if God commands you to do an act because He 
commanded it, then you have an obligation to do X because He commanded 
it. This latter obligation would count as an obligation to obey God. This is 
because to obey God is to do something because God commanded you to 
do so. Therefore, on M-DCT, there can be a moral obligation to obey God, 
namely, whenever God commands us to do certain acts because He com-
manded it. Let me use an analogy to illustrate this point. If a legal authority 
makes a rule to do X, then you have a legal obligation to do X. Here, there 
is no legal obligation to obey legal authorities. The legal authority can 
instead make it a rule to do X because they told you so. This would then 
result in a legal obligation to do X because the legal authority told you 
so. Doing X because the legal authority told you so is what it is to obey 
the legal authorities. So, in cases where the legal authorities make it a rule 
to do X because they told you so, you would then have an obligation to 
obey legal authorities. In this way, M-DCT can explain how there can be 
obligations to obey God.
Objection: Brute Ethical Facts
One might object that I had criticized N-DCT for positing brute ethical 
facts. One might think that M-DCT also posits brute ethical facts. M-DCT 
says that God creates our moral obligations out of normative nothingness. 
This cries out for an explanation. It seems natural to ask, how can God do 
this? If there is no moral obligation to obey God’s commands, how can 
his commanding activity create our moral obligations? Now, if there is no 
further explanation why this is so, then M-DCT seems to stop at an unsat-
isfactory explanatory point. Also, M-DCT would suffer similar criticisms 
as N-DCT above.
But M-DCT can offer a further explanation. Consider once again the 
case of legal obligations. As argued earlier, defenders of LACT can affirm 
that whatever grounds legal authority would give legal authorities the 
power to create legal obligations. The same explanation can be given by 
DCT proponents. Indeed, DCT proponents have tried to ground God’s 
moral authority in various ways such as by appealing to God’s character, 
God’s position to us, and God’s desires towards us. For example, David 
Baggett and Jerry Walls argue that God’s perfect knowledge, love, and 
33I thank Mark Murphy for this point.
382 Faith and Philosophy
power jointly gives God the moral authority to issue binding commands.34 
Therefore, M-DCT does not stop at an unsatisfactory explanatory point. 
The explanation is that God has moral-authority-granting-properties.
Here, one might object that all of the existing accounts of what grounds 
God’s authority are not adequate and so this would pose a problem for 
M-DCT. This objection however will not work. Even if current accounts of 
what grounds God’s authority fail, M-DCT proponents can still hold that 
whatever grounds God’s moral authority explains why God has the power 
to create moral obligations for us. Just as a defender of LACT does not 
need to have worked out a satisfactory theory of legal authority in order 
to hold to LACT, the M-DCT proponent does not need to have worked out 
a satisfactory theory of God’s moral authority in order to hold to M-DCT.
Now the objector might say that, even if there is an explanation for 
why God can create our moral obligations out of normative nothingness, 
we can further ask why it is the case that if a being with moral-authori-
ty-granting-properties commands us to p, then we have a moral obligation 
to p. What grounds this fact? The objector can point out that even if there 
is a further explanation, the explanatory chain has to stop somewhere 
and so there will be a brute ethical fact. Indeed, Heathwood has given a 
convincing argument that all moral theories must posit at least one brute 
ethical fact.35
I admit that I think it is a brute fact that if a being with moral-authori-
ty-granting-properties commands us to p, then we have a moral obligation 
to p. This seems like an adequate explanatory stopping point. Even if I’m 
wrong and there is a further explanation, it seems right to think that the 
explanatory chain has to stop somewhere and so there will be a brute fact 
somewhere along the line. Admitting all of this, however, does not pose a 
problem for M-DCT. First, it seems to me that the brute fact above is not an 
ethical fact. This is because it is a conditional which does not entail the exis-
tence of any moral obligations or any normative state of affairs. So, M-DCT 
need not posit any brute ethical facts. Second, even if the conditional above 
is to be considered as a brute ethical fact, this is not problematic because 
it is not a brute moral obligation. My criticism of N-DCT was not that it 
posited brute ethical facts; rather the problem with N-DCT was that it 
posited a brute moral obligation. On M-DCT, however, none of our moral 
obligations are brute since all of our moral obligations are explained by 
God’s commands. The conditional above is not a moral obligation. There-
fore, M-DCT can avoid the earlier problems I raised with N-DCT. Unlike 
N-DCT, M-DCT would have an explanatory advantage over non-theistic 
accounts of morality (like Wielenberg’s ethical theory), since M-DCT does 
not posit any brute moral obligations but offers a deeper explanation for 
all our moral obligations. Also, since M-DCT does not posit any brute 
moral obligations, it can also use the standard arguments for DCT unlike 
34Baggett and Walls, Good God, 122–123.
35Heathwood, “Could Morality Have a Source?”
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N-DCT. Lastly, it would not be an objection to M-DCT to point out that it 
posits other kinds of brute ethical facts which are not moral obligations. 
This is because M-DCT is a theory of our moral obligations. All M-DCT is 
trying to explain is the grounds of our moral obligations, not the grounds 
of all ethical facts. So, as long as the brute ethical fact it posits is an ade-
quate explanatory stopping point, then this would not be problematic for 
M-DCT.
Conclusion
I have argued that DCT proponents should affirm M-DCT. Doing so es-
capes the prior obligations objection. Other theological stateist theories 
can also modify their theories accordingly to escape the prior obligations 
objection. For example, take Matthew Jordan’s Divine Attitude Theory 
(DAT) which says that our moral obligations are grounded in God’s at-
titudes.36 One may raise the prior obligations objection and ask if there 
is a moral obligation to do what God is pleased with and to not do what 
God is displeased with. Jordan can simply adopt metaethical DAT and 
say that there is no prior moral obligation to do what God is pleased with. 
Instead, God’s attitudes ground our moral obligations out of normative 
nothingness. So, the same defenses as above could easily be adopted by 
switching commands to attitudes. The prior obligations objection is, I be-
lieve, unsuccessful against theological stateism.37
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